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I. INTRODUCTION
In the post-Enron era of aggressive government investigations into cor-
porate misconduct, increasingly, in order to grant a corporation "cooperative"
status in determining whether to charge the corporation and in sentencing, gov-
ernment agencies require waivers of the attorney-client privilege, resulting in
the disclosure of internal investigation materials.' This recent trend towards
Attorney, Wheeler Trigg Kennedy, Denver Colorado. J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center 2000; B.S. Tulane University 1993. This article is dedicated to Craig P. Cummings with
gratitude for his vital support and encouragement.
I AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT 17 n.2 (May 18, 2005),
available at www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/ [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT] (ex-
plaining that the SEC "regards the production of attorney-client privileged information . . . as a
necessary element of cooperation."); Pricilla L. Walton, Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege
Goodbye: The Erosion of the Privilege by Federal Financial Regulatory Agencies, 10 N. C.
BANKING INST. 397 (2006) (quoting Memorandum of Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson
in 2003 as stating that one of "nine factors for federal prosecutors to consider in making decisions
with respect to prosecuting businesses [is] 'the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure...
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waiver of the privilege by corporations has exposed a troubling tactic practiced
by attorneys conducting internal investigations.
When conducting an internal investigation into potential wrongdoing
within a corporation on behalf of a corporate client, a corporate lawyer has an
ethical duty to warn 2 the employee interviewee that the lawyer represents the
corporation, rather than the interviewee, and that the corporation may eventually
waive the attorney-client privilege, which would allow for the disclosure of the
employee's communications with the attorney. However, attorneys often give
"watered-down" warnings in an effort to extract full information from employ-
ees and zealously represent their clients, the employer corporations.3
As the result of giving "watered-down" warnings, which was referred to
by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as "a legal and ethical mine
field,"A many individual employees have disclosed information to corporate
attorneys, believing that they were communicating within a personal attorney-
client relationship. The Circuits are split on whether an individual employee
who had a reasonable belief that he was communicating with his counsel can
assert the attorney-client privilege to block the disclosure of his communications
when the corporation waives the privilege.5
including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work-product protection."');
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g)(2) (2004) (subtracting culpability points if an
organization fully cooperates with the investigation); Richard S. Gruner, Three Painful Lessons:
Corporate Experience with Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 1536 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
CORPORATE LAW AND PRAC. HANDBOOK SERIES 61 (2006) (discussing the disclosure requirements
required by the government in deferred prosecution agreements).
2 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.13(d) cmt (2003) (explaining that warnings
must be given when it becomes "reasonably apparent that the organization's interests are adverse
to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing"); Dennis P. Duffy, Selected Ethics
and Professionalism Issues in Labor and Employment Law Cases, SL031 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CLE,
ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 943 (2005) and accompanying notes (explaining
that warnings should be given prior to any interview with corporate employees, even in the ab-
sence of apparent adverse interests).
3 See cases discussed infra in Part I.
4 In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that although
the court stated that it did not approve of the watered-down warnings, it held that the attorney did
not establish an attorney-client relationship with the individual when he said that he "can" repre-
sent the individual, rather than stating that he "does" represent the individual).
5 Some circuits hold that individual employees may not prevent the disclosure of corporate
communications with corporate counsel, even if the employees reasonably believed they were
making the disclosures within the attorney-client context, and even if the attorney misled them.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 119 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Bevill Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d
120, 125 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005).
Other circuits hold that an individual's assertion of the attorney-client privilege can prevent the
disclosure of corporate communications with corporate counsel if the employee had a reasonable
belief that he was communicating within a personal attorney-client relationship. See Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Keplin-
ger, 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985); Wylie v. Marley Co., 891 F.2d 1463, 1471-72 (10th Cir. 1989);
Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, 156 F.3d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 1998).
[Vol. 109
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This Article examines the differing judicial approaches to determining
whether an individual can assert the attorney-client privilege to block the disclo-
sure of his communications with corporate counsel. Specifically, the article will
examine the differing judicial approaches within the framework of the major
theoretical justifications for the attorney-client privilege, utilitarian justifica-
tions, and individual rights-based justifications. In doing so, the article exposes
the weaknesses of the approach that errs in favor of the corporation and disclo-
sure, and argues that the only approach justifiable by utilitarianism or rights-
based justifications is the approach that errs in the favor of the individual and
confidentiality.
Section I of this Article will review the attorney-client privilege and
examine the theoretical bases that have been used to justify the attorney-client
privilege. Section III will review the two contradictory judicial approaches to
ruling on individual assertions of the attorney-client privilege when the em-
ployer-corporation waives the privilege. Section IV will analyze the two judi-
cial approaches within the framework of the theoretical justifications for the
attorney-client privilege and will argue that the reasonable belief standard that
errs in favor of the individual and confidentiality is the only justifiable ap-
proach. Section V will conclude the Article.
II. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest principles of evidence,
dating back to at least the Sixteenth Century.6 The attorney-client privilege pro-
tects confidential communications from disclosure where the communication
was made in the context of the client seeking professional legal advice from the
attorney.7
The attorney-client privilege originally belonged to the attorney and was
"a privilege designed to protect a gentleman of honor from being forced to com-
promise his integrity. ''8 "By the mid-1700s, the honor-based theory of confiden-
tiality had been repudiated and replaced by another,9 according to which the
privilege belonged to the client, not the lawyer."' 0
6 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, 531 n.15 (John T.
McNaughton ed., Boston: Little, Brown and Company 1961).
7 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2292.
8 DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 188 (Princeton University Press
1988); see also Michel Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attorney-Client Privilege: In
Search of an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary System, and the Corpo-
rate Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 495, 508 (1982); 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 6, § 2290, at 543.
9 However, this justification is still occasionally cited. For example, in Hickman v. Taylor,
the Supreme Court discussed the "demoralizing" effect that weakening of the privilege would
have on the legal profession, and in his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson stated: "I can conceive
of no practice more demoralizing to the Bar than to require a lawyer to write out and deliver to his
adversary an account of what witnesses have told him." 329 U.S. 495, 511-16 (1946). Some
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The two main justifications for the attorney-client privilege are utilitar-
ian justifications (which focus on furthering the good of society) and rights-
based justifications (which focus on protecting the individual client's rights and
human dignity). These two approaches demonstrate the tension in the American
legal system between "the rights of the individual and the good of society.""
Courts often differ in attorney-client rulings depending upon whether they be-
lieve that the attorney-client privilege is based on utilitarian grounds or individ-
ual rights-based grounds. Conversely, individual court rulings can be justified
by picking the applicable theoretical justification. The next two sections will
examine each of the theoretical justifications in turn.
A. Utilitarian Justifications
Since the mid-1700s, the standard justification for the attorney-client
privilege has been that justice would better be served by the "full and frank"
communication that arises when clients do not need to fear that their lawyers
will reveal their confidences over their objection.' 2 This is commonly referred
to as the "utilitarian" justification."' 3  Utilitarian arguments focus not on
whether the individual actions are morally correct, but rather on whether the
consequences are good.' 4 A consequence is considered good, and therefore cor-
rect, under the utilitarian theory, if the consequence "brings greater happiness to
a greater number of individuals.
1 5
Professor Wigmore, considered the foremost advocate for the utilitarian
justification 6 for the attorney-client privilege, argued that the privilege is justi-
fied if "[tjhe injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of [the
communication would] be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation. '17 As an outgrowth of Wigmore's writings, "arguments
about what rule will yield the largest number of correct verdicts are 'utilitarian"'
arguments.'
8
commentators have gone so far as to say that the only benefit of the attorney-client privilege is job
security for lawyers. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 1
(1998).
10 Id. (citing Lord Grey's Trial 9 How. ST. TR. 127, 131 (1682)).
11 Rosenfeld, supra note 8, at 495.
12 See, e.g., MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 175 (Edward W. Cleary ed.,
West 2d ed. 1982) (1972); Rosenfeld, supra note 8, at 508; LUBAN, supra, note 8, atl90.
13 Rosenfeld, supra note 8, at 507-08.
14 Id. at 507.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 507-08.
17 Id.; WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2285, at 527.
18 LUBAN, supra note 8, at 191.
[Vol. 109
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Even arguments against the privilege have most often been posed in
terms of the privilege's lack of social utility. For example, in 1827, Jeremy
Bentham argued that the attorney-client privilege should be abolished as it only
benefits the guilty. 19 He argued that the revelation of guilty facts would only
help bring the guilty to justice, that the withholding of guilty facts from an at-
torney would also help bring the guilty to justice, and that the innocent have
nothing to fear from revelation of confidences. 20 This argument has been ex-
panded upon in recent years by Daniel Fischel who argues that not only does the
privilege only help the guilty, but that it actually hurts the innocent because "the
privilege makes it more difficult for the innocent credibly to communicate that
they have nothing to hide.",21 These arguments focus on whether the privilege
actually results in the most number of correct verdicts. In other words, the ar-
guments focus on social utility and are inherently utilitarian arguments.
The Supreme Court's justification for the attorney-client privilege is
most often based on utilitarian principles. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the
Court explained that the purpose of the privilege is "to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administra-
tion of justice., 22 The Upjohn Court went on to explain that the "privilege
recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and
that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully in-
formed by the client., 23 This justification has been consistently enunci-
ated by the Court.24
B. Individual Rights-Based Justifications
In recent years, commentators have argued that the proper justification
for the attorney-client privilege should focus on the individual rights of the cli-
ent. Monroe Freedman, the foremost proponent of the rights-based justification
19 See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO
ENGLISH PRACTICE 304 (John S. Mill ed., London: Hunt and Clark 1827).
20 See id.
21 Fischel, supra note 9.
22 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("The lawyer-client privilege
rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for
seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out."); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391,403 (1976) (stating that the purpose of the privilege is "to encourage clients to make
full disclosure to their attorneys"); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) ("The rule which
places the seal of secrecy upon communications between client and attorney is founded upon the
necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of
the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when
free from the consequences of the apprehension of disclosure.").
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for the attorney-client privilege, explained that the concern for an individual's
human dignity requires that no defendant, whether he be guilty or innocent, be
"required to stand alone against the awesome power of the [government].
Rather, every criminal defendant is guaranteed an advocate .... The lawyer can
serve effectively as advocate, however, only if he knows what his client knows
concerning the facts of the case. 25
David Luban explains that it would violate an individual's human dig-
nity to allow disclosure of attorney-client confidences in the criminal context
because "[t]he right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination are both
grounded in respect for human dignity .... [U]nless the defendant can compel
her lawyer's silence, she is put in the position of trading one right off against the
other., 26 Luban points out two moral imperatives that are generally accepted
truths in American law: 1) because it is moral torture and an affront to human
dignity to say to a person that he must "take part in his own destruction," he
may not be compelled to incriminate himself; 2) because a person should not be
penalized by the law based upon his lack of experience, ability, or knowledge of
the law, he is entitled to a lawyer to act as his "mouthpiece. 27 Therefore,
Luban argues, it would be wrong to force a "trade-off' between one's right to
self-incrimination and his right to a zealous advocate.28
Luban acknowledges that the traditional individual rights arguments are
most persuasive in the criminal context and do not completely carry-over into
the civil context.29 However, Luban points out that the individual rights argu-
ments, which are based upon an individual encountering the power of the state,
do apply when an individual is faced in the civil context with a "powerful pri-
vate adversar[y]. ' '3°
Theoretical justifications for the attorney-client privilege are not neces-
sarily mirrored by the prevailing jurisprudence. A survey of the case law re-
veals that courts have taken different approaches to applying and justifying the
privilege. In the corporate context in particular, application of attorney-client
privilege has created two contradictory bodies of precedent.
I. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE ASSERTIONS OF THE
PRIVILEGE
Corporations, as legal entities, may avail themselves of legal counsel.
Therefore, the privilege that exists between an attorney and an individual client
applies equally to a corporate client. However, because of the frequent conflict
25 MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4 (1975).
26 LUBAN, supra note 8, at 195.
27 Id. at 193-97.
28 Id. at 197.
29 Id. at 203-04.
30 Id. at 204.
[Vol. 109
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between the individual employee's interest and corporate interests, the applica-
tion of the attorney client privilege in internal corporate investigations often
proves difficult. In the Supreme Court's seminal case reaffirming the corporate
attorney-client privilege, Upjohn Co. v. United States,31 the Court left open the
question of whether the attorney-client relationship can ever be established with
an employee interviewee where the lawyer also represents the corporation, and
if so, what standard should be used to determine whether the relationship and,
therefore, the attorney-client privilege arose. The circuits are now split on
whether an individual who believed that he was communicating confidences
within the context of the attorney-client privilege may prevent a corporation
from later waiving the privilege as it relates to those communications. One
group of circuits errs in favor of the corporation and disclosure, while a second
group of circuits errs in favor of the individual and confidentiality.
A. Approach Favoring the Corporation
The Second,32 Third,33 and Fourth34 Circuits have held that individual
employees may not prevent the disclosure of corporate communications with
corporate counsel, even if the employees reasonably believed they were making
the disclosures within the attorney-client context, and even if the attorney actu-
ally misled them into believing they were speaking within the attorney-client
context. For example, in United States v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters35, the Second Circuit held that an election campaign manager could not
claim the attorney-client privilege to protect his communications from disclo-
sure once the campaign waived the privilege, even though the individual had
asked repeatedly if the conversations were privileged and was told by the cam-
paign's counsel that they were. 36 The law firm even consulted with outside
counsel regarding whether the individual would be able to eventually assert an
31 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn, courts were divided
over whether the attorney-client privilege extended only to communications between an attorney
and a corporation's "control group" or whether the privilege also covered communications with
employees outside the control group if they were made at the direction of the corporation's supe-
riors and were relating to subject matters dealing with the employee's duties within the corpora-
tion. In Upjohn, the Court invalidated the narrower control group test and "declined to lay down a
broad rule" regarding what communications are privileged. 449 U.S. at 386. However, the
Court's decision on the facts was based on rationale that looked very much like the subject matter
test. See id.
32 See United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
33 See In re Bevill Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding that a corporate employee may never assert a personal attorney-client privilege with
regards to corporate communications with corporate counsel).
34 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005).
35 119 F.3d 210.
36 Id. at 213.
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individual attorney-client privilege under the circumstances. 37 The Second Cir-
cuit specifically stated that the individual's "reasonable belief' regarding repre-
sentation was not relevant, notwithstanding its acknowledgement that the attor-
ney may have violated the spirit of the ethical rules in misleading the individual
to believe that he was represented by the attorney.
38
Similarly, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal,39 the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that employees could not assert the attorney-client privilege to block
disclosure of communications made to corporate counsel, even though the attor-
neys told the employees that they "can represent [you] until such time as there
appears to be a conflict of interest," and that "we will advise you at the time that
a conflict appears," and that they "did not recommend" that the employees re-
tain their own counsel.40 The Fourth Circuit stated that it did not approve of the
attorney's "watered-down" warnings, which it described as a "legal and ethical
mine field," yet it concluded that even if the employees believed that the attor-
neys represented them, that such a belief could not be objectively reasonable
because the statement "'we can represent you' is distinct from 'we do represent
you.'41
This approach taken by the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits disre-
gards the individual employee's belief, and instead errs in favor of the corpora-
tion, the attorney, and disclosure.
B. Approach Favoring the Individual
While the approach taken by the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits dis-
regards the individual employee's belief by allowing the corporation to waive
any privilege and disclose what the employee said during the course of an inter-
nal investigation, other circuits have reached a different conclusion. The Sev-
enth42 and Tenth43 Circuits have held that an individual's assertion of the attor-
37 See id.
38 Id. at 216-17.
39 415 F.3d 333.
40 Id. at 336.
41 Id. at 340. Note that the Fourth Circuit stated in dicta that one reason that the individual
employees' belief that they were represented by counsel was not reasonable was that an attorney-
client privilege cannot arise between an attorney and the employee interviewee where the corpora-
tion controls the privilege. Id. at 339-40. However, this reasoning is patently circular. In fact, the
court went on to state that had the attorney stated that he "does" represent the individuals, rather
than that he "can" represent the individuals, that an attomey-client relationship would be formed
and that the attorney would be obligated under the ethics rules to withdraw as counsel for both the
individual and the corporate clients. Id. at 340.
42 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985).
43 See Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, 156 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (10th Cir. 1998)
("[A] corporate officer's discussion with his corporation's counsel may still be protected by a
[Vol. 109
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ney-client privilege can prevent the disclosure of corporate communications
with corporate counsel when the corporation waives the privilege if the em-
ployee had a "reasonable belief' that the she was communicating with the attor-
ney within a personal attorney-client relationship.
In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.44, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the attorney-client relationship did arise, and therefore, the indi-
vidual employees could block disclosure of the contents of their communica-
tions on corporate subject matter where the individual employees had a "reason-
able belief' that the corporate attorneys conducting the internal investigation
represented them.45 The court explained that "[t]he deciding factor is what the
prospective client thought when he made the disclosure, not what the lawyer
thought." 46 In United States v. Keplinger47, the Seventh Circuit clarified the
"reasonable belief' standard that it enunciated in Westinghouse, stating that the
standard is met if the "potential client's subjective belief is minimally reason-
able. 48
The Tenth Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit's approach49 and held
that "a corporate officer's discussion with his corporation's counsel may still be
protected by a personal, individual attorney-client privilege when the conversa-
tion specifically concerns the officer's personal liability" and that the individ-
ual's claim of attorney-client privilege could block the corporation's disclosure
of the employee's communications with corporate counsel if the employee
"could have believed" that the attorney represented him.5°
This approach taken by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits focuses on the
individual employee's belief when making his disclosures to the corporate
counsel and errs in favor of the individual employee and confidentiality.
personal, individual attorney-client privilege when the conversation specifically concerns the
officer's personal liability.., based on conduct interrelated with corporate affairs.").
44 580 F.2d 1311.
45 Id. at 1321.
4 Id. at 1319 & n. 14 (quoting RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETtucs 284 (1970)).
47 776 F.2d 678.
48 Id. at 701 (stating no attorney-client relationship where relationship actually adversarial and
controversial, statements made in the presence of third parties, no legal advice sought, and no
ambiguous statements made by attorneys).
49 Lower courts in other circuits have also followed this approach. See, e.g., United States v.
Hart, No. 92-219, 1992 WL 348425, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Nov. 16, 1992) (holding that individual
employees may assert the attorney-client privilege with regards to their communications with
corporate counsel, because they had a "reasonable belief' that the corporate counsel represented
them).
50 Wylie v. Marley Co., 891 F.2d 1463, 1471 (10th Cir. 1989); see also Grand Jury Proceed-
ings v. United States, 156 F.3d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting an individual attorney-client
privilege could arise even when the subject matter related to corporate affairs, as long as the
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IV. UTILITARIAN OR RIGHTS-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE APPROACHES?
A. Utilitarian Justifications
The approach of the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, which favors
the corporation and disclosure, to allow the disclosure of an individual's com-
munications with corporate counsel, even when that employee reasonably be-
lieved that the communications were made within the attorney-client relation-
ship, is not justifiable by utilitarian principles. The Second Circuit attempted to
justify its decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters using utilitarian
principles, arguing that the "reasonable belief' standard would "provide em-
ployees seeking to frustrate internal investigations with an exceedingly powerful
weapon., 51 However, this analysis is not sound.
The Second Circuit's justification glosses over the fact that the case ad-
dressed an instance where an employee was actually led by counsel to believe
that the disclosures were made within the personal attorney-client context.
52
The question in this line of cases is actually what harm would inure if attorneys
were required to give individuals proper warnings. The utilitarian justification
is based on the assumption that the attorney-client privilege is needed to encour-
age full and frank communication with one's attorney, without fear of disclo-
sure.53 Accurate warnings would not frustrate this goal, but would, in fact, fur-
ther this goal because individual employees would retain their own counsel if
they understood the nature of the relationship.
A rule that allows an individual to be duped into disclosing information
places uncertainty into all attorney-client relationships, and as the Supreme
Court has recognized, "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better
than no privilege at all."5 4 Under the utilitarian theory, this uncertain privilege
would "inhibit communications because clients will fear the eventual public
disclosure of their conversations.... [I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privi-
lege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected." '5 This
"chilling effect," which restricts individual-attorney communication, in turn
restricts corporation-attorney communication, because a corporation can only
communicate with its attorney through its individual employees. Therefore,
utilitarian principles cannot support this approach.
51 119 F.3d at 216 & n.2.
52 Id. at 217 (noting the court admitted that the attorney in the case violated his ethical duty to
inform the individual that he was not their client).
53 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391.
54 Id. at 393.
55 Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 473 (1987).
[Vol. 109
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In contrast, the approach taken by the Seventh 6 and Tenth57 Circuits
that allows an individual's assertion of the attorney-client privilege to prevent
the disclosure of his communications with corporate counsel if the employee
had a reasonable belief that the he was communicating within a personal attor-
ney client relationship can be justified by utilitarian principles.
Under this approach, an individual seeking legal advice can be assured
that his disclosures will be kept in confidence and that he will not unwittingly
give information to a person whom he believes to be his attorney but who may
ultimately disclose those communications over the individual's objections. This
approach is sound under the utilitarian theory, because it will encourage full and
frank conversations between individuals and attorneys, which is the utilitarian
justification for the attorney-client privilege.
Therefore, the only approach that can be justified by utilitarianism is the
approach that favors confidentiality in ambiguous circumstances. This is the
only approach that will provide individuals with the certainty that is required to
foster full and frank communication with attorneys.5
B. Rights-Based Justifications
A corporation is not human and therefore has no human dignity to pro-
tect. This was recognized by the Supreme Court when it ruled that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to corpora-
tions. 59 Therefore, there are no rights-based arguments that could justify erring
in favor of corporations.60
However, the individual employees being interviewed pursuant to an in-
ternal investigation do have their human dignity at stake. This is especially true
when the individual employees could be subject to personal criminal sanctions,
as is often the case with internal investigations. 6 1 The individual's human dig-
56 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985).
57 See Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, 156 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (10th Cir. 1998)
("[A] corporate officer's discussion with his corporation's counsel may still be protected by a
personal, individual attorney-client privilege when the conversation specifically concerns the
officer's personal liability ... based on conduct interrelated with corporate affairs.").
58 Some might argue, based on Bentham's utilitarian analysis, discussed supra Part II.A, that
the result argued here is evidence that the attorney-client privilege should be abolished, because it
only benefits the guilty. This Article is not arguing in favor of the attorney-client privilege based
upon utilitarian grounds. Rather, this article argues that the only approach that can be supported
using utilitarian arguments in its favor is the approach that favors the individual and confidential-
ity.
59 See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 99 (1974).
60 This has led some commentators to argue effectively that the attorney-client privilege
should be abolished as it applies to corporations. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 8, at 232-33.
61 This is due to the very nature of internal investigations, because such investigations are
undertaken in response to purported wrongdoing by employees.
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nity continues to be a concern when the communications are eventually pro-
vided to civil plaintiffs, as the civil suits that ensue are often brought as large
shareholder derivative suits62 which provide the "powerful adversary" referred
to by Luban.63
The individual's human dignity is compromised through the approach
that favors the corporation, because the individual has been tricked into taking
part in her own demise. A person giving information to a corporate attorney
whom she believes is her personal attorney is tantamount to an individual under
interrogation giving incriminating information to a police officer who leads the
suspect to believe that he is the suspect's attorney. A person's human dignity is
affronted when she takes part in her own destruction, whether she does so as the
result of force or of trickery. 64
Moreover, a rights-based justification that allows an employee to pre-
vent corporate waiver of information obtained from him in the course of an in-
ternal investigation will reinforce the current ethics rules. Ethics rules exist to
protect the rights of individual clients. Yet, protecting clients' rights is not al-
ways easy when conducting an interview pursuant to an internal investigation
because the attorney is subject to two conflicting ethics rules. On the one hand,
the lawyer has the duty to inform the interviewee if a conflict arises and that the
interviewee should consult other counsel.65 However, on the other hand, the
lawyer has the duty to zealously represent his client, the corporation.66  The
approach that does not allow individuals to assert the attorney-client privilege to
block disclosure of their communications favors zealous representation and dis-
favors the duty to inform. The reasonable belief standard that resolves ambigui-
ties in favor of the individual and confidentiality reinforces the balance imposed
by the rules, because it encourages attorneys to engage in zealous representation
of their corporate clients within the boundary requirement of fully and honestly
informing each individual employee.
62 A circuit split exists regarding whether this disclosure to the government comprises a waiver
of the attorney-client privilege with regards to third parties, but in many instances, a corporation's
cooperation with the government results in the attorney-client communications being used by
future civil plaintiffs. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d
1414, 1424-25 (3d Cir. 1991); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977);
In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For discussion of this
issue, see Zach Dostart, Comment, Selective Disclosure: The Abrogation of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 33 PEPF. L. REv. 723 (2006).
63 See LUBAN, supra note 8, at 204.
64 Note that this approach is also reminiscent of the time when the privilege belonged to the
attorney, as discussed supra, as the courts that adhere to this approach are very lenient with mis-
behaving attorneys. This approach ensures that the unscrupulous corporate attorneys do not need
to withdraw as counsel, as they would need to do if the courts ruled that attorney-client relation-
ships had arisen.
65 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 1.7 (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 131 cmt. e (2000).
66 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT, R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2005).
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Under the rights-based justification, in an ambiguous situation, the indi-
vidual's human dignity should be protected and the individual's communica-
tions from his own mouth should not be stolen through unscrupulous attor-
neys.67 Therefore, under the rights-based approach, the only approach that can
be justified is that which errs on the side of the individual.
V. CONCLUSION
In an effort to zealously represent their corporate clients and gain in-
formation from employees, corporate attorneys conducting internal investiga-
tions into potential employee wrongdoing often give "watered-down" warnings
to employee interviewees. These "watered-down" warnings fail to inform em-
ployees that the corporation owns the attorney-client privilege and may later
waive the privilege for the ensuing conversations. This leads many individual
employees to believe that they are communicating with counsel within a per-
sonal attorney-client relationship.
The circuits are split on whether an individual who believed that he was
communicating confidences within the context of the attorney-client privilege
may prevent a corporation from later waiving the privilege as it relates to those
communications. One group of circuits errs in favor of the corporation and dis-
closure, and a second group of circuits errs in favor of the individual and confi-
dentiality, holding that an individual can prevent the disclosure of her commu-
nications with corporate counsel when the corporation waives the privilege if
the employee had a "reasonable belief' that the she was communicating with the
attorney within a personal attorney client relationship.
After analyzing the two contradictory judicial approaches within the
framework of the two major theoretical justifications for the attorney-client
privilege, utilitarian justifications (which focus on furthering the good of soci-
ety) and rights-based justifications (which focus on protecting the individual
client's rights and human dignity), this Article concludes that the reasonable
belief standard that errs in favor of the individual and confidentiality is the only
justifiable approach. The approach that favors the corporation and disclosure
cannot be justified by the utilitarian approach, because the uncertainty caused by
the approach has a chilling effect on attorney-client communications. The ap-
proach favoring the corporation and disclosure cannot be justified by the rights-
based approach, because a corporation has no rights to protect.
In contrast, the reasonable belief approach that favors the individual and
confidentiality can be justified by the utilitarian approach, because it encourages
67 Some have argued that an attorney should never engage in joint representation of a client
and a corporation. However, this Article deals with the situation where an attorney has already
given the appearance that he does represent the individual. It would not be helpful in this situation
to state after the fact that the attorney should not engage in joint representation. To deny that the
relationship was established simply because it should not be established is tantamount to saying
that a remedy should not exist because the tort should not have occurred.
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full and frank attorney-client communication. It can further be justified by the
rights-based approach, because it protects each individual's human dignity by
ensuring that each person is not tricked into taking part in his own demise.
Therefore, this Article concludes that the approach favoring the individual and
confidentiality should be uniformly adopted.
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